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Abstract 
The thesis hereby submitted, ‘How Does Technological Development And Adoption Occur In The 
Media? A Cultural Determinist Model’ was originally published in Media Technology and Society A 
History: from the telegraph to the Internet (London: Routledge 1998) and Technologies of Seeing: 
Photography, Cinematography and Television (London: British Film Institute 1996). The argument  
outlined in those two books is further supported and updated by six other texts published 
between 1995 and 2005 on  the same topic.    
 
Media Technology and Society A History: from the telegraph to the Internet deals with the development 
of electrical and electronic mass media proposing  a model for the nature of such developments. 
It is a final iteration of an approach to this history which has its origins in work first begun  in the 
1970s.  Technologies of Seeing: Photography, Cinematography and Television applies the same model to 
photographic and cinematographic technologies.  The thesis argues that all these media 
developments can only be understood in a social context; that they are to be understood as 
examples of what has become known  as ‘socially shaped technology’1 (or, in terms of the thesis, 
‘cultural determinism’).   
 
This is contrary to the received dominant view that technology itself is the driver determining 
social formation  – termed the  ‘technological determinist’, ‘technicist’ or ‘diffusion theory’ 
approach. In rejecting technicism, ‘How Does Technological Development And Adoption Occur In The 
Media? A Cultural Determinist Model’ proposes  instead an original, pioneering contribution to a 
revisionist cultural determinist/SST historiography as well as outlining a model to explicate at a 
theoretical level how such innovations and adoptions occur.  
 
 
 
                                                 
1 See: Mackay & Gillespie,1992  
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Introduction 
 
 
This candidacy for a doctorate on the basis of published work rests on the   
 
portfolio of eight published items listed above, and on this accompanying  
 
critical commentary.  
 
This commentary, in accordance  the University of Lincoln's Research Degree Regulations, has be 
designed to furnish an explication of the initial thesis being proposed , its intellectual context and 
an account  of its development; as well as an account of the further materials up-dating it, and 
some assessment of its reception.  The commentary therefore demonstrates how the portfolio 
constitutes a significant, coherent pioneering contribution to the field of media studies, 
specifically:  
a) to an emerging revisionist tradition of media history, viz.: the history of the development 
of media technologies since telegraphy by grounding  such developments in the social 
sphere (‘SST’/’cultural determinist’); and  
b) to a parallel emerging critique of the dominant view of this history as being 
‘technologically determined’ and therefore inadequate; and 
c) to an original and coherent model of how such culturally determined technological 
development (SST) has operated to diffuse new media technologies throughout the 
period since the Industrial Revolution. 
 
The commentary is organised:  
a) to provide a synoptic account of the thesis;  
b) to afford an intellectual context for its development: 
i) first in terms of a critique of the received history (i.e. technicism) 
ii) then in terms of  my own  intellectual formation and the specific 
development of the thesis as a revisionist historical project termed cultural 
determinism; 
c) to contextualise the supporting texts as further applications of the model outlined in the 
thesis to developments not dealt with in Media Technology and Society A History: from the 
telegraph to the Internet or Technologies of Seeing: Photography, Cinematography and Television; 
d) to discuss the methodology deployed; 
e) to assess the reception of the thesis;  
f) to offer issues for further work. 
 It is assumed that the portfolio, in the order presented, will be read prior to this commentary. 
Declaration and Acknowledgements 
 
All parts of this thesis are my own work, with the sole exception of  “Myth of the Internet”, an 
article jointly authored with Paul Walton in 1996. 
 
Critical to this dissertation is the encouragement of Professor Sylvia Harvey without whom the 
work would not have been undertaken. 
 
Ideas contributing to the development of the thesis date back more than three decades and to 
make a full acknowledgement of my debts to all who have influenced and informed the work is 
therefore not entirely possible. But I can note that my earliest published thinking on this topic 
(1974) acknowledges Nicholas Garmham, Dave Ryden and the late Caroline Heller. The first 
book-length articulation of the model (1986) was deeply indebted to my then colleagues at New 
York University, especially William Boddy and Michelle Hilmes. The colleagues influencing and 
informing the two major texts here submitted are duly acknowledged in the attached electronic 
copies of the books. 
 
For guidance  in writing this commentary I am most grateful to Professor Sylvia Harvey and Dr. 
Ann Gray, my supervisors. 
 
And it is to them, my other Lincoln colleagues and my family that I dedicate it. 
 
 
Critical Commentary  
 
The Central Thesis  
 
How does technological development and adoption occur in the mass media?  
Any chronological list of important milestones in communications media is likely to give 
significant place to technological developments. For example, Downing, Mohammadi & Sreberny 
Mohammadi determine that between Cro-Magnon’s possible acquisition of language circa 
35,000BC and the development of a ‘silicon superchip’ in AD1994, no less than a third of 
significant date commemorate ‘technological breakthroughs’ (1995: ix-xii). The most widely 
understood narrative explicating this sequence offers, in essence, a series of overlapping 
biographies of ‘inventors’ – Gutenburg and Daguerre, Morse and Bell, the Lumiérès and Marconi, 
Baird and Turing etc. etc. – until, by the mid-20th century, the work of ‘invention’ is wholly 
subsumed by the research and development laboratories of great corporations whence emerge, as 
the products of usually anonymous technicians, the transistor and the pocket calculator, the 
digital watch and the videotape recorder, the mobile phone and the TV satellite etc. etc. – in an 
unending stream, usually perceived as ever more life-enhancing (or, more rarely, culture-
threatening).   
 
This thesis is a response to the inadequacies of such popular accounts of these milestones. 
Neither the history of the development nor the impact of technological developments in the 
media can be effectively captured by a narrative which is merely the ‘progress of great men’  – 
aside, of course, from the fact that women and non-Europeans figure little, if at all, in it.  Such 
accounts grossly simplify the complexities of technological creativity; pay scant regard to social 
contexts and realities; and are frequently distorted by national biases and basic error. 2   
                                                 
2 Johannes Gutenberg (c. 1400 – 1468) is conventionally credited with the first printed press from 
moveable type in the West; but he was not the only person at work on this technology at the time and 
moveable type was anyway long established in, at a minimum, Korea and China. Charles Daguerre (1787 -- 
1851) is conventionally credited with the development of photography but he was a showman working to 
an agenda determined by his partner Nicéphore Nièpce (1765 -- 1833) and anyway his system produced 
unique images unlike the photographic process that was to prevail which used negatives capable of 
producing multiple copies. Samuel Morse (1791--1872) was a portrait painter who relied on other scientists 
and technologically more sophisticated minds, for example, Joseph Henry, a physics professor at the 
institution that was to become Princeton. He too had many legitimate rival claimants to the title ‘inventor 
of the telegraph’.  Alexander Bell (1847 -- 1922) was an elocution teacher with an interest in deafness. He, 
like Morse, relied on assistants, notably Thomas Watson (1854 -- 1934), an able young electrical engineer. 
It is also probable that Bell’s first effective telephone was the result of his being given a sight (illegally) of 
the patent application of his rival Elisha Gray (1835 – 1901). The Lumière brothers (August 1862 -- 1954 
and Louis 1864 to 1948) were not, as is commonly supposed, responsible for the first cinema show for a 
paying audience in December 1895. Theirs was the fourth and they were among a host of entrepreneurs and 
technologists working on movie image systems at that time. Guglielmo Marconi (1874 --1937) was more of 
 It is possible, however, to see ‘the great men’ account of technological change as a vulgar variant 
of an equally pervasive but more refined approach, now termed ‘diffusion theory’ (see, for 
example, Rogers, 1995).  Diffusion theory shares with the ‘great man’ approach an inherently 
linear sense of technological developments as a species of ‘progress’ as that concept is commonly 
understood; and whether for good or ill. It does, however, deal in a fuller and more complex 
fashion with the scientific and technical contexts in which developments take place but, in 
common with much history or sociology of science, tends to focus less on broader social factors.  
It privileges the ‘progress’ of technology as a determining factor on the broader society and can 
therefore be termed a ‘technological determinist’ or ‘technicist’ approach. The technicist tradition 
has a (dominant) positive ‘technophile’ bias that sees new technologies as beneficent; but there is 
also a significant ‘technophobe’ strand in the tradition, equally insistent on the socially-
determining nature of technology but seeing this as, in some instances, baleful. The point is that 
both the technophile and the technophobe variants of technological determinism put technology 
before (as it were) society. The thesis herein proposed is therefore as much as response to the 
inadequacies of developed technicist accounts as it is to the vulgarities of populist ‘great man’ 
narratives.  
 
It does not stand alone, however as both in the broad history of technology and in the more 
specific area of media technological history there has been a second more recent and less 
popularly understood approach which, in essence, denies technology as the driver of social 
change. Instead, society is conceived of as the major factor determining the technological agenda 
and conditioning the diffusion of the technologies it produces. This ‘social shaping of technology’ 
– ‘SST’ -- is also deterministic and can therefore be termed ‘cultural determinism’; but it seeks to 
place the work of the technologist within the broader social sphere suggesting that the 
technological agenda is influenced by social needs and that the successful diffusion of any given 
technology depends on its social acceptability, its ‘fit’ (as it were).  As it denies technology a 
                                                                                                                                                 
a scientist than these others being a physics graduate from the University of Bologna – which is why he 
knew about the devices he used for his radio experiments. His contribution – no small thing – was to realise 
that the higher the aerial the further the signal could be sent. Needless to say, others were at work on 
wireless telegraphy at the same time. (He was also the only one among this group to receive a Noble prize -
- for physics in 1909.) John Logie Baird (1888 – 1946) was a failed entrepreneur who became obsessed 
with mechanically scanned television and never fully grasped the principles of electronic scanning which 
were to prevail. Nevertheless, the British popularly persist in regarding him as ‘the father of television’. 
Alan Turing (1912 -- 1954) was, undoubtedly, one of the most influential mathematicians of the 20th 
century, responsible, in 1936, for a breakthrough paper which lies at the very foundation of computing 
science; but he was not, as is increasingly being popularly claimed, a father of computing in any practical 
sense. In fact, he had trouble changing light bulbs. The popular understanding of the nature of technological 
change in the media is completely inadequate. 
determining role in society, it tends to be less judgemental as to technology’s effects, seeing them 
rather as consequences of other social factors. 3.1.3. Although the 
work on technology was specifically designed 
as a corrective, it was not without its own 
context.  In one sense it is nothing but an 
elaboration for one field   media technology 
  of what Fernand Braudel has identified as 
 brakes  and  accelerators  governing 
technological change in general (Braudel 
1981: 430). It also fitted into a small but 
persistent literature critiquing the concept 
of an  information revolution  (e.g. Noble 
1984, Berringer 1986) which have now even 
started to appear in a more popular form 
(e.g. Stoll 1996). 
 
Given the wide reception of technological determinist explanations of technological change, 
cultural determinism can often seem counter-intuitive, rejecting technology as an engine of social 
change and resisting arguments that it is either ‘out of (social) control’ or that it materially alters 
social – much less (as is sometimes claimed) human sensory – realities.  
 
This thesis is a pioneering contribution to the cultural determinist (SST) approach as it can be 
applied to media technology.  In essence it attempts to correct technicist failings by seeking to be 
more firmly grounded in social science and history and thereby better rising to the basic 
challenge of capturing of the myriad complexities of social phenomena with which it deals. It 
does this by attempting to write what anthropologist Cliford Geertz has termed ‘thick’ (i.e. 
nuanced, multifaceted, comprehensive) accounts (Geertz 1973). Given that the assumption of 
cultural determinism is that society shapes technology there is, as a consequence, an inevitable 
element in the analysis which takes cognisance of the past -- i.e.: what is the background to the 
social factors that have been at work conditioning the technological agenda? The thesis uses a 
detailed history of the media to develop a theoretical pattern explicating how innovations are 
born and brought to the point of effective diffusion. Its novelty lies in the application of a 
theoretical pattern drawn from structuralism being applied to the narrative history. 
 
In contradiction to the basic tenet of technicism – that technologies advances inexorably – the 
historical record reveals that its diffusion is far from inevitable that they do so. Indeed, the 
opposite is true. Fernand Braudel3 puts it in this way: 
First the accelerator, then the brake: the history of technology seems to consist of 
both processes, sometimes in quick succession: it propels human life onward, 
gradually reaches new forms of equilibrium on higher levels than in the past, 
only to remain there for a long time, since technology often stagnates, or 
advances only imperceptibly between one 'revolution' or innovation and another 
(1981:430). 
It is therefore the case in Braudel’s view that, although science and technology, as are 'uniting 
today to dominate the world -- such unity depends necessarily upon the role played by present-day 
societies, which may encourage or restrain progress, today as in the past'. What drove the 
changes we call the industrial revolution, changes which made the modern world, were 
grounded in the societal forces unleashed by early Western capitalism and the imperial 
expansion of Western nationalism. In other words, society always leads technology. 
 
Media technologies, at least as far as the historical record is concerned, exhibit the characteristics 
of other technologies and are just as subject to Braudel’s accelerators and brakes.  A case cannot 
be made for any sort of media technological exceptionalism, although the most hyperbolic 
technicist rhetoric often does this.  This, though, is without prejudice to the possibility that other 
                                                 
3 Fernand Braudel (1902 -- 1985) was a leading historian of the annaliste school. He has been called ‘the 
greatest historian of the 20th century’. 
technologies (unexamined here) can better make an exceptionalist case -- e.g. medical or military 
technology -- essentially because social ‘accelerators’ are more, and social ‘brakes’ are less 
effective in these areas.  Therefore, although I am proposing that there is nothing particularly 
exceptional about media technology, nevertheless prudence suggests that any conclusions 
reached as to the pattern of its development and social diffusion should not be more broadly 
applied without specific further research.   
 
Limiting this discussion to media technologies suggests that the complex Braudelian pattern of 
brakes and accelerators can be explained by a model which attempts to balance the lineality of 
historical development against non-linear social factors.   
 
Modelling Technological Change in the Media 
The two main sources conditioning the model in Media Technology and Technologies of Seeing were 
the historical record of media technologies from photography and the telegraph to the internet 
and structuralist linguistics. {The thesis is fully outline in the submitted books but a synoptic 
account  of the model is attached as appendix A} 
 
The historical narrative was interpreted according to Hemplerian assumptions as to the nature of 
historical causality. Hemple articulated a theoretical approach to causaulity in XXX (1942),  
QUOTE HIM FROM MISUNDERSTANDING ME.  There is clearly a problem here since opposed 
to this view is…….Geyl  But it seem to me viable to assume a general theory of the nature of 
historical change could be applied to the particular history of media technologies. 
 
The second theory utilised in building the model was structuralism. Out of suasrrian linguistics 
this has emerged as a supertheory.  For the model it seemed that the concept of transformation – 
from langue to parole, from deep structure to surface, could be melded effectively to dconstruct 
the process leading from the idea to the difussed device.  
 
This became a structuralist explanation for change (utilising Chomskyan terms) whereby, against 
a ground of formal and informal scientific understanding (linguistic ‘competence’ in Chomskyan 
terms i.e. langue), technologists suggested transformative ideas (a stage I named ‘ideation’) which 
resulted in the creation, ‘in the metal’ of devices which were ‘technological performances’ (cf. 
Chomskyan linguistic ‘performances’ i.e. utterances or paroles) designated as ‘prototypes’ 
(Chomsky: 1979).  Categories of prototypes were elaborated but the crucial point was that this 
process of competence, ideation and performance, and all subsequent phases of the model, took 
place inside a social sphere which therefore determined the ideation transformation of scientific 
competences into technological performances.  
 
A second transformative stage – which I designated ‘supervening social necessity’— also arose 
from within the social sphere and impacted on this stream of technological performances with 
the result that, on a comparatively arbitrary basis, one of the prototypes – technological 
performances -- created subsequent to the operation of this transformative event was declared to 
be an ‘invention’.  Therefore, in communications, ‘inventions’ are prototypes created after the 
supervening social necessity (which could take a variety of forms as outlined in the model) was 
identified. Given that supervening social necessity created a general social context for the 
technologist’s research and development activities, the phenomenon of simultaneity was thus not 
surprising; nor was the marginalisation of original thinkers and prototype builders.  
 
What also needed to be explained was why hyperbolic claims for the impact of new 
communications technology did not ever actually materialise in significant ‘revolutionary’ 
outcomes (or, better, had not thus far done so).  To do this required the introduction of another 
social transformative phase into the model, to operate subsequent to the ‘invention’ phase. I 
designated this a ‘law’, using quote marks to indicate that although its operation was certain 
enough to be always present, its specific outcomes were not quite as inevitable as the operation of 
a law’s would (or ought) to be.  This transformative ‘law’ argued that new media technologies, 
already determined by social necessities, were introduced – that is diffused – only in so far as 
their socially disruptive (‘revolutionary’) potential was suppressed.  The price of diffusion, as it 
were, was exactly the suppression of those effects identified as inevitable revolutionary outcomes 
by hyperbolic technicists.  The ‘law’ of the suppression of radical potential ensured the new 
technology’s social ‘fit’ and conditioned the last phases addressed in the model, that of diffusion 
and spin-off.   
 
Ergo the entire received rhetoric of an ‘information revolution’ was in error, supported by neither 
the historical record nor current situations.  Technicist hyperbole was the result of significant 
historical amnesia and that many commonly received views – that technological change in media 
produced revolutionary social change; that the pace of technological development was 
increasing; that technology was somehow ‘outside’ social control – were spurious.  
 
The Intellectual Context as a critique of received history (i.e. technicism) 
Raymond Williams4 elegantly suggests that:  
The basic assumption of technological determinism is that a new technology -- 
a printing press or a communications satellite – ‘emerges’ from technical study 
and experiment.  It then changes the society or the sector into which it has 
‘emerged.  ‘We’ adapt to it, because it is the new modern way (Williams 
1989:120). 
Therefore, technological determinism:  
is an immensely powerful and now largely orthodox view of the nature of social 
change.  New technologies are discovered, by an essentially internal process of 
research and development, which then sets the conditions of social change and 
progress.  Progress, in particular, is the history of these inventions, which 
'created the modern world'.  The effects of the technologies whether direct or 
indirect, foreseen or unforeseen, are as it were the rest of history (Williams 
1974:13). 
 
It can be argued that technological determinism has achieved its hold over the Western 
mind exactly because is meshes fundamentally with the Western mindset, notably the 
deep-seated concept of progress.  By the 18th century Christianity’s promise of human 
perfectibility had acquired a more materialist cast. The Enlightenment view was that the 
human race, now ‘emancipated from its shackles released from the empire of fate’ was 
‘advancing with a firm and sure step along the path of truth, virtue and happiness’ (as 
Concordet put it).5
 
Crucial here is the image of humanity’s ‘advance’.  This exactly echoes the technological 
determinist vision of a flow of emerging technologies determining the structures of the 
society.  This reflection is not, it must be noted, dependent on sharing Concordet’s 
optimism about the end result of this advance; humanity could just as easily be rushing 
towards an abyss. In the same way, new technology might be positioned as an engine 
facilitating ‘truth, virtue and happiness’; or it could bring exactly the reverse results. 
 
                                                 
4 Raymond Williams (1921 -- 1988) was a mid-20th literary critic of considerable influence on the 
development of cultural studies, one of the first seriously to study the cultural formations of television 
(1974). He is not here defining technological determinism from a sympathetic viewpoint.  
5 Concordet was a contributor to the Encylopédie, a key work of the 18th century European ‘enlightenment’ 
edited by Diderot and D’Alembert.   
However, the central difficult with technicist explanations is that they do not entirely 
explain the phenomena with which they deal.  
 
2.2.1 Historical Amnesia 
Technicist accounts are not, as in the ‘great man’ approach, simply wrong; but they are 
still inadequate as effective explanations of the developments they seek to describe. 
 
By focusing on the technology there is a tendency to simplify.  The pre-history of devices 
is truncated or entirely omitted.  So, for example, sound film is a development within the 
area of Western lens and theatrical cultures and is therefore determined by centuries of 
pertinent advances.  This truncating of history has a profound effect since it supports a 
vision of technological upheaval and constant change. It lies at the heart of the idea that 
developments are ‘revolutionary’ when in fact they are far more evolutionary.   
 
The tendency to hyperbole is a widespread characteristic of technicism.  Take Marshall 
McLuhan, among the first to make the media an object of study in the post World-War II 
era (and also one of the few to achieve celebrity thereby becoming in the process a major 
‘guru’ of the 1960s):6  
Physically the printed book, an extension of the visual faculty, intensified 
perspective and the fixed point of view …. Socially the typographic extension 
of man brought in nationalism, industrialism, mass markets, and universal 
literacy and education. In bringing the ancient and medieval worlds into fusion 
– or, as some would say, confusion – the printed book created a third world, the 
modern world which now encounters a new electrical technology or new 
extension of man. (McLuhan 1964:157)  
Here, in what has become a quite typical manner, hyperbole meshes with ahistoricism to 
suggest that a 15th century technological advance (printing from moveable type) is 
responsible social phenomena (nationalism etc) which only manifest themselves centuries 
                                                 
6 Marshall McLuhan (1911 -- 1980), professor of English at the University of Toronto. A Catholic convert 
who saw the modern world in terms of decline, he allowed his basic negative position to be systematically 
misinterpreted. Thus his opinion of advertisements as being a central mark of contemporary Western 
civilisation was taken by the advertising industry as a very welcome legitimation of its activities. 
Advertisers were responsible for propelling McLuhan into the public eye.  When there he remained more or 
less silent as to what he really thought about contemporary culture. 
later.  But even where historical causality it not stretched in this way, there is a desire to 
overstate claims about social impacts. 
 
Currently, at its most extreme, such hyperbole suggests that the technologies are 
advancing at a pace that wipes out the established truths of, say, economics or the lessons 
of history and old approaches have no further validity. Such spurious technicist reasoning 
was the root of the ‘dot.com’ stock market fiasco of the late 1990s.  The old rules did 
apply after all and the market crashed.   
 
By this date, the network which was supposed to be driving this revolution was, as we 
have seen in 2.1.2, half a century in the making and the ‘digital revolution’ within the 
‘Information Revolution’ was in its sixth decade of development, the first device to 
encode an electronic signal digitally having been built in 1938 (Winston 1998:133-4).  In 
turn that device relied on mathematical calculations as to sampling rates which had been 
theoretically determined a decade earlier.  The digital devices, including the computer, 
that were to suffuse the market in the last quarter of the 20th century relied on solid state 
electronics which were not ‘invented’ (as is commonly believed) at the Bell Labs in 1948 
but go back to experiments with semi-conductors in 1879.  Cats’ whiskers radios were 
the first solid-state technology to be widely diffused from the 1920s on. (These radios, of 
course, were in the boyhoods – they were all men7 -- of more than one of the 
technologists who built the first transistors and computers after World War II.)  It is 
therefore all too often the case that technicist accounts, in so far as they are necessarily 
historical – else how can ‘revolutionary’ impact, for example, be established – tend to be 
history written by amnesiacs. 
 
You need section on history of 
alternative SST approach 
 
 
The Intellectual Context as a revisionist historical project  
                                                 
7 With the singular exception of Grace Hooper (1906 – 1992), an American naval officer who, from a 
position of considerable influence in the US Office of Naval Research, was responsible in the early 1950s 
for encouraging (against considerable hostility) the development of computer languages.  She retired as an 
admiral. 
1.2.  
My interests have developed since I first published in the discipline 30 years ago but my central 
concerns have remained constant.  The following briefly sketches this background: 
 
1.2.1. I am not a trained scholar as I left university, having read law, in 1963 to become a 
television researcher and, over the next decade, a director and producer. I was moved to begin a 
study of the industry in which I worked because of a growing personal dissatisfaction with what 
I felt were the day-to-day limitations of public service broadcasting: that is, the institutional limits 
constraining PSB’s potential to bring meaningful information on a full range of events and 
opinions to the audience.  This is not to say I sympathised with the then fashionable Leavisite 
attack on the media -- as in Denys Thompson (1964) or, more curiously, in elements within Hall 
and Whannel (1967).  Obviously, as a media worker I was much more in tune with the anti-
elitism of Hoggart (1958) and Williams (1963, 1964, 1966) and the celebration of Hollywood to be 
found Cahiers du Cinema and Movie.   
 
1.2.2. Assuming media sociology must have produced the insights I was seeking, my first 
approach was to examine what was the then to me hidden work of, for example, Klapper (1960), 
Schramm (1960, 1963), Halloran (1970) et al; but the media effects tradition in which they largely 
worked seemed extremely inconclusive and un-illuminating.  Marshall McLuhan, with one of 
whose daughters I was to produce an extremely bad Canadian feature film, once asked me if I 
knew Wilbur Schramm.  I said I did not and McLuhan said: ‘Wilbur was the sort of a man who, if 
you asked him to define measles, would go round counting the spots on people’s faces’ – as good 
a critique of positivist media sociology as any.  McLuhan’s own work (1963, 1967), although -- as 
Jonathan Miller pointed out (1971) -- extremely important because it brought before a wide 
readership the then startling proposition that the media were worth studying at all, unfortunately 
seemed to me to be equally flawed especially in its cavalier treatment of historical cause and 
effect.  
1.2.2. Another initial issue that concerned me was my own ignorance of the fundamentals of the 
mass media technology.  Neither I nor the vast majority of my peers as producers, directors and 
researchers had any clear notion of how the medium actually worked and this ignorance, 
obviously  
also shared by the public, contributed to the general ideological obfuscations around media 
policy and power. Technology, for example, was the key to the media’s ideologically powerful 
claim on the real – a claim that was to also become a central concern of mine in that the scientific 
basis of broadcasting logically underpinned the objectivities on offer from the media. My sense, 
which has not materially altered, is that concerns about media output in general and PSB in 
particular were a product of a certain insouciance about imaging and electronics as well as 
stemming from more obvious, and more discussed, editorial and other creative processes.  An 
explanation of the technology and a critique of the sociology of the mass media therefore 
constituted the subject of my first published work (1973, 1974). 
 
Why I didn t do post modernism 
 
3.1.1. Although the work of the Glasgow Media Group had been informed by my professional 
understanding of production realities, the question of media technology, in the nature of the case, 
had not been foregrounded in the study.  Therefore, after Glasgow, I returned to this topic.  I had 
noted in my initial work on technology (1974) that the received histories of the development of 
the media appeared to follow a pattern of almost Proppian regularity. Apart from the inevitable 
appearance of a ‘great man’ inventor (they were, of course, all male) there was a curious 
precursor figure whose fate it was, apparently, to be ignored both at the time he (again, all were 
men) presented his innovative device and subsequently by history.  The obvious explanation for 
this marginalisation, that the device did not work, was not inevitably the case, for sometimes the 
devices were indeed fit for purpose; conversely, nor was it true that the so-called ‘invention’ 
actually worked better or, indeed, very well at all.  Furthermore, with many media technologies, 
after the fallow period following the work of this solitary figure there would be a sudden spurt of 
activity leading to the more or less simultaneous presentation of devices, one of which would be 
arbitrarily selected by history the ‘invention’. This observation led me towards a revisionist 
history of media technologies (1986) and the elaboration of a theory of technological development 
prior to the moment of diffusion. This last, of course, was the subject of considerable attention in 
economic and business studies and was therefore not central to my interest.  The pattern of 
change I elaborated sought to explain the phenomenon of ‘invention’ in terms other than the 
mysterious operation of individual creativity.  This was represented in a revised and expanded 
form in Media, Technology and Society (Published Text 5/1998) and is therefore to be considered 
here. 
You need history of development  of 
the project here 
 
 
h) Methodology???? Do I need this???? 
 
 
 
g) Further Applications  
h)  
i) Reception 
3.1.4. Media Technology & Society (5 1998) has been reprinted five times was well received 
internationally.  It was awarded the best book of the year prize by the American Society for 
History and Computing and was also favourably reviewed in the Times Literary Supplement by 
Bruno Latour.  Outlines of the basic model have been reprinted a number of times (e.g. chapter 1 
has been translated (2001) as “Ein Sturm von Paradies:Technologische Innovation, Verbreitung 
und unterdrüking/ Die Informationsrevolution als Hyperbel” in Mediale Historiographien. Other 
reprints have used different versions, e.g. the 1986 version has been used in (2000) Electronic 
Media and Technoculture, and another iteration (3/1996) was reprinted in (2000) Film and Theory: An 
anthology.  
 
3.2.1. Latour’s major critique of Media Technology & Society was that I had failed to deal with older 
media technologies, viz.: print, photography and cinematography.  Actually I had been 
researching these histories and accounts (1990) and had demonstrated how the model applied to 
these areas.  A collection of previously published essays, Technologies of Seeing (3/1996) had 
brought together work on the technology of photography and cinematography which specifically 
applied the model outlined in Media Technology & Society with other work on the racism implicit 
in the colour film stocks (initially published in 1985) and the technological conservatism of 
Hollywood in opting repeatedly (gauge, sound system, colour system) for the most expensive 
technological options as  a barrier controlling rival entrants.  Further details of the development 
of 16mm appeared in Germany (7/2001).  
  
3.3.1. Perhaps the most effective indicator of esteem is that the model for technological change 
original proposed in 1986 is the basis of the article, commissioned by Michael Schudson, on 
“Media Technology” in the International Dictionary of Social & Behavioural Sciences (8/2002).   
 
   
j) Future Research 
 
3.3.2. Some other aspects of this work have yet to be further explored.  For example, the history of 
print as a technology is as yet unpublished but does figure in the more general history currently 
in press (Messages), albeit without direct reference to the model.  A concern with the limits of the 
technological imagination, as seen, for example, in science fiction has yielded only one article 
thus far (2/1995) on Blade Runner. There has been a more thorough response to the technicist 
hyperbole surrounding the supposed internet/dot.com revolution of the late 1990s beginning 
with an evaluation of mistaken millenarianist approaches to these phenomena (5/1995; 6/2001).  
This criticism of dot.com hysteria melds with an equally oppositional approach to the issue of the 
supposed digital revolution in image making in general terms, for example in a 1989 article on 
HDTV which was reprinted in Technology of Seeing (3/1996).  A more sustained body of criticism, 
however, bridges my interest in technology with concerns about the documentary and will 
therefore be dealt with below. 
 
Empowerment 
MEDIA TECHNOLOGY & SOCIETY 
• A Klee painting named 'Angelus Novus' shows an 
angel looking as though he is about to move away 
from something he is fixedly contemplating.  His eyes 
are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. 
This is how one pictures the angel of history.  
MEDIA TECHNOLOGY & SOCIETY 
• His face is turned towards the past.  Where we 
perceive a chain of events, he sees one single 
catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon 
wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet.  
MEDIA TECHNOLOGY & SOCIETY 
• The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and 
make whole what has been smashed.  
 
 
MEDIA TECHNOLOGY & SOCIETY 
• But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with 
such violence that the angel can no longer close them. This storm 
irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the 
pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call 
progress. 
Walter Benjamin 
 
 
Notes 
 
Appendix  
 
3.3.1. The Linguistic Analogy 
To achieve this balance, let us apply insights arising from another field of social study, viz. 
Saussurean linguistics.8 This offers a useful basis for building a cultural determinist model of 
technological change in the media first because it too is grounded in the social sphere. It also has 
both historic (that is, in Saussurean terms, ‘diachronic’) and contemporary (‘synchronic’) 
dimensions.  This duality is required to achieve an understanding of media technological change, 
too. 
 
                                                 
8 Ferdinand de Saussure (1857 -- 1913) was a pioneer of modern linguistic study whose model of speech 
production is a source of the mid-20th century ‘super-theory’ known as ‘structuralism’. The Saussurian 
concepts used here are drawn from the 3rd Course in General Linguistics which he gave in 1910/1911 and 
are known only from his students’ notes. 
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Thus, the situation of any communications technology can be represented synchronically (in the 
social sphere) as the intersection of a diachronic body of fundamental knowledge (which might 
or might not encompass theoretical concepts and can be called, reverting to the original general 
sense of the word, ‘science’); and the application of such knowledge 'in the metal' (as the 
engineers say, when actually meaning in any material, of course) – that is, technology.  
 
Suassurian linguistics offers a further insight as to how the relationship of science and technology 
within the social sphere might be explained. Technology  can be thought of as analogous to the 
concept of ‘utterance’ in linguistics. Utterance is a surface expression of deep seated mental 
competence which can be termed ‘language’. Technology, therefore, is conceived of as a species 
of surface 'utterances' in a 'language' called science.  Substituting the terms 'performance' for 
'utterance' and 'competence' for 'language', as Noam Chomsky does when glossing Suassure, 
better explains the structural relationship of the two – ‘performance’ is the surface expression of 
deeper mental ‘competence’. (Chomsky  2002 (1957)).9 In the same way, technology can be 
though of as  a performance of a competence arising from science (or knowledge). Technology 
thus stands in a structural relationship to science analogous to the relationship of utterance to 
language competence in linguistics. 
 
3.3.2. The First Transformation – Ideation 
It is less useful to continue with de Saussure at this point because in linguistics rules (grammar) 
govern the transformation from mental competence to physical performance. The relationship 
between scientific competence (especially given we are using the term in the broadest sense of 
knowledge and understanding) and  technological performance cannot be said, in any 
meaningful way, to be similarly rule-governed.  
 
Nevertheless,  a technology moves from inchoate scientific knowledge (which itself is 
conditioned by society) to wide diffusion in society via a number of transformations analogous to 
this basic linguistic transformation from competence to performance.  First, the technologist (his 
or herself, of course, a product – in fact, a ‘prisoner’ -- of their culture) transforms  ‘scientific’ 
understanding into an actual device.  
 
DIAGRAM 2  
                                                 
9 Noam Chomsky (b. 1928) is a leading scholarly linguist as well as being at the forefront of American 
radical political dissent. 
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In the model of technological change we are building, this first transformation can be termed 
‘ideation’. The historical record is replete with examples of creativity envisaging technological 
possibilities, sometimes going back for centuries. For example, the idea of speaking over long 
distances was mentioned  by Renaissance savants who clearly had little idea how to achieve such 
an effect beyond the fact that magnetism might somehow be involved.  However , in the  decades 
before the creation of an effective telephone (say 1830-1870), better informed minds were already 
grappling with the problem in a viable way. In the 20th century, the concept of digitalisation as a 
method of modulating an electric signal dates back, as theory, to the 1920s.10  Sometimes, the 
technologists having these ideas were (and are)  moved to take them a stage further and produce 
‘in the metal’ a device which can be defined as a ‘prototype’. ‘Ideation’ therefore produces 
technological performances which can be described as ‘prototypes’. 
                                                 
10 The theory of digital modulation was first applied to an actual piece of equipment in 1938, which 
therefore, in contrast to the technicist rhetoric stressing a contemporary ‘revolution’, marks the start of the 
digital age. 
 3.3.3. Technological Performance – Prototypes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DIAGRAM 3 
PERFORMANCE
COMPETENCE
PAST
FUTURE
Technology
Science
PROTOTYPES
IDEATION
SPHERE
SOCIAL
 
 
 
Prototypes can be of four classes: 
Obviously, they might not work very well, if at all.  It is possible that, for example, the earliest attempts at 
telephones beginning in the 1860s did not function; or, if they did function, as did mechanically-scanned 
television in the 1920s and 1930s, they were less efficient than other prototypes being developed at the same time.  
Such devices can be termed ‘partial prototypes’.  
 
However, it is, perhaps surprisingly, not the case that the majority of prototypes in the media are ineffective. On 
the contrary, they are often as effective as the earliest examples of the technology that was eventually to be 
diffused as ‘the invention’. For example, an effective device can be in existence, and indeed in wide use, for 
another purpose.  In the late 19th century university physics laboratory there were a number of contrivances 
designed to demonstrate the validity of the wave theory of electromagnetic phenomena. These, which worked 
very well for this purpose, were eventually to form the basis of wireless telegraphy when that application came 
into play. Such devices can be thought of as ‘parallel prototypes’. 
 
A third class of ‘rejected prototype’ can be as effective (or nearly so) as the eventual solution at 
solving the technological problem but is eventually set aside and not diffused.  For example, 
various static electric telegraphs dating back to the Napoleonic Wars were ignored because of 
conservative military and political opinions (both in comparatively liberal states such as Great 
Britain, for example, as well as in autocratic Russia). Despite the fact that these devices would 
have given significant greater signalling capacity than did the semaphore, military need was not 
sufficient to force through the change.  
 
Sometimes, the prototype, although not the final, widely-diffused technological performance, can 
nevertheless be so effective that it does achieve a measure of diffusion and, indeed, can act as a 
brake on the diffusion of the ‘invention’ itself.  An example of such an ‘accepted prototype’ would 
be large-volume, electric, Hollerith punch-card calculators, introduced at the turn of the 20th 
century. These were of considerable sophistication and were so widely diffused that they 
distorted research and development on the electronic computer in the middle decades of the 20th 
century. 
 
Instead of a progression of prototypes, it is possible to read the development of technology as a 
‘cluster’ of innovations, meaning that a ‘technology’ is in effect ‘reinvented’ as it moves towards 
full diffusion (Rice and Rogers, 1980) but this does not explain why such ‘reinventions’ occur, 
what prompts them and why only one is normally accepted as the ‘invention’. Nor does such a 
view address Braudel's observation that technologies can remain unexploited for long periods of 
time, the ‘accelerator’ un-activated.   In the model being proposed, the explanation for this 
phenomenon lies with the operation of a second transformation which emerges not from the 
enclosed world of the laboratory but directly from the social sphere.   
 
3.3.4. The Second Transformation – Social Necessity 
In this model, Braudelian ‘acceleration’ can be thought of as an external social force, or 
combination of such forces, acting on the production of prototypes.  When these forces come into 
play, they transform the prototype into a device that is widely diffused. This second 
transformation can be thought of as the operation of supervening social necessity of one sort or 
another.  
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Supervening social necessity be roughly classified into three sub-types: 
 
The least contentious of these is a social necessity occasioned by the activation of another technology.  For 
example, rejected prototypes of effective telegraphs were produced prior to the supervening social necessity 
created by the instantaneous signalling needs of the railways.  Devices produced after the widespread 
introduction of the railways were adopted as the ‘invention’ of telegraphy. Similarly, the new ‘radio’ or ‘wireless’ 
application of the parallel prototypes of the wave detection equipment lying around university labs was 
occasioned by the introduction of large ‘Dreadnaught’ ironclad battleships which, for the first time, steamed into 
action out of sight of one another, necessitating a new signalling system that worked beyond the horizon.  
 
Equally well-defined is the second sub-type of social necessity.  This emerges from the economic need of firms to 
refine and expand their offers in the marketplace.  This creates for them a strictly commercial need to open up 
new markets with constantly revised or essentially new technologies.  The operation of such needs has created 
technologies from Polaroid movies and 16rpm long-playing records to audio mini-cassettes and laser-disc videos. 
It should be noted that this is the least certain of the sub-types of supervening social necessities because although 
such commercially driven needs can be massively effective (as in the case of the CD or the mobile phone), they 
can also, as these other examples indicate, often fail.  As consumers, although far from immune, we are less prone 
to fall in with corporate social necessities of this type than might at first be thought.  
 
More contentious, because lines of causality are less easy to determine, is the third sub-type, a 
social necessity arising from society without involving either the demands of another technology 
or the desires of commerce.  For example, the rise of the modern business corporation, a legal 
creation of the third quarter of the 19th century, created today's office, the architecture of the 
building which houses it and the key machines -- telephone, typewriter and calculator -- which 
make it function. All of these devices were either in existence or being developed prior to the 
1870s but it was in that decade, as a consequence of the legal advances that produced the 
corporation, that these prototypes were effectively brought to market as ‘inventions’. Similarly, 
entertainments from piano-rolls through radio to television can be attributed to the emergence at 
the turn of the 19th/20th century of an ever-increasing number of non-aristocratic homes housing 
a growing mass of Western urbanites comfortably enough to allow for leisure pursuits within 
them.   
 
The operation of supervening necessity is independent of the technological performances which 
have been producing prototypes and this flow of devices does not stop. However, after the 
operation of this second transformation, a further prototype (as it were) becomes what is 
popularly called the ‘invention’.  
 
3.3.5. Technological Performance – ‘Invention’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
DIAGRAM 5 
PERFORMANCE
COMPETENCE
PAST
FUTURETechnology
Science
PROTOTYPES
IDEATION
SOCIAL
NECESSITY
SUPERVENING
SPHERE
SOCIAL
'INVENTION'
 
 
 
By locating ‘invention’ as a consequence of, or response to, a social necessity the phenomenon of 
simultaneity is also explained.  Simultaneous ‘invention’, whereby more than one technologist 
produces the ‘invention’ at more of less the same time, is a common feature of media history. 
Given that technological advances in the media depend little, if at all, on the acquisition of new 
knowledge (or ‘science’), the ‘inventors’ of new media technology are never ‘eureka’ pioneers 
experiencing blinding moments of insight, simultaneously or otherwise. Rather they are system 
engineers who are moved, in response to social need, to utilise available ‘science’, often old, 
widely known knowledge, to produce devices which are then designated by society as 
‘inventions’.   The most dramatic instance of this simultaneity is that Alexander Graham Bell and 
his rival Elisha Gray both arrived at the Washington patent office on the same day, 14 February, 
1876, with designs for an ‘the electric speaking telephone’.  Both knew the other was at work on 
an ‘acoustic telegraph’ and were quite consciously in a race; but neither was inspired by any 
knew knowledge of any kind.  Why then, if they were not responding to the new circumstances 
of business organisation in the later 1870s, were they both moved to tackle this problem? 
Effective dynamic electric telegraphs, radios, cinematographic cameras, large scale integrated 
circuits etc. etc. were also produced by many independent researchers simultaneously, leading to 
inevitable conflicts about primacy and patents.  
 
Since the operation of a supervening social need is independent of the production of this flow of 
devices, its effect is primarily to facilitate diffusion. It does not require that ‘inventions’, 
technological performances subsequent to its operation, are actually more effective than the most 
effective of prototypes which preceded its operation. For example, patents existed for the use of 
magnetic tape as a memory or storage medium for electronic calculators from 1943.  Such tape 
was easily a more efficient storage medium than those developed subsequent to the 
determination of a social need for a computer (essentially, the necessity of calculating extremely 
complex thermo-nuclear ignition problems).  These included glass tubes filled with mercury, 
cathode ray tubes or nickel or iron-oxide plated metal drums which were said to be superior 
because they were not subject to contamination by dirt as the tape was. Yet this reasoning is 
spurious because within five years, by the early 1950s, tapes were being used, the apparent 
‘problem’ solved by nothing more complex than dust-free cabinet housings for the tape decks 
(Winston 1998: 176; 187-8). The real difficulty, justifying ignoring the more efficient magnetic-
tape prototype was, simply, that the tape was a German (indeed, a  'Nazi') technology and as 
such tainted in the years after World War II.  
 
Conversely, it is occasionally the case that the ‘invention’ does not work very well at all. The 
device for which Bell was awarded the master patent for telephony did not work as well as that 
outlined that same February day by his rival Gray.  In fact, neither Bell’s vibrating magnet nor 
Gray’s bowl of sulphuric acid (as described in the patent applications) was the solution, the 
actual ‘invention’ of the telephone.  Instead, a period of intense research and development, 
conducted along lines that were to become commonplace in the 20th century, ensued.  This effort 
involved a number of other technologists, notably Thomas Edison (in his laboratory, itself a 
prototype for the industrial lab that was to be the dominant site of technological research and 
development in the next century) and Emile Berliner.  By 1879 these, and others, collectively 
produced the telephone as a diffusible contrivance. Bell, though, still held the master patent and 
remains, in the popular mind, the ‘inventor’ of the telephone.  
 
3.3.6. The Third Transformation – Suppression of Radical Potential 
 
As a cultural determinist, I would not dispute the basic premise of technicism that new 
technologies contain considerable disruptive power (for good or ill).  However, since 
technologies arrive in the market as the result of supervening social needs or necessities, the 
disruption they can cause – at least in the West whence in essence they come -- is likely to be 
contained.  It is, as the historical record shows, extremely unlikely to be in any sense 
‘revolutionary’. Because of supervening social needs, they will be widely diffused through 
(Western) society but they will, as often as not, nevertheless be heralded as agents of profound 
social change. 
 
This is not to say that process of diffusion or adoption, despite the social ‘fit’ guaranteed (as it 
were) by supervening social necessity, will be without some greater or lesser measure of friction – 
Braudel’s ‘brakes’.  In the model, this braking effect, even in a West dedicated to progress in 
general and nuerungsfreundigkeit (a love of new things) in particular, can be described as a third 
transformation, one where the power of a new technology to disrupt society, especially pre-
existing formations of capital, is suppressed.    
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Suppression works against the radical disruptive social effects of new communications 
technologies. This does not mean that new technologies are never diffused (obviously they are 
adopted); or that they have no social effects (again, obviously, they do). But the suppression of 
radical potential is the price (as it were) for diffusion. Technologies, already determined by the 
social formation of technologists at the ideation stage and impacted by the effect of supervening 
social necessities are now, by the operation of the suppression of radical potential, further made 
to 'fit' into society.  
 
Rather than privileging the impact of the technology, a cultural determinist approach will seek 
to understand how the effects of supervening necessity (the ‘accelerator’) interacts with the 
‘brake’ involved in the suppression of radical potential.  Balancing these two contrary social 
forces slows the rate of diffusion so that the social fabric in general can absorb the new machine 
and essential formations such as business entities and other institutions are protected and 
preserved – albeit not necessarily for ever. Despite the occasional instance of a case such as 
Eastman-Kodak, a corporation truly threatened by technological advance (in its case the 
digitisation of photography), the persistence of the great communication conglomerates attests 
that, the cut-throat nature of market place competition notwithstanding, companies are seldom 
if ever entirely wiped out.  It is true that in the 1870s, the world’s largest corporation was the 
Western Union telegraph company and although it is far from being a major player any longer it 
does still exist in an extremely profitable niche.  Marconi’s, on the other hand, is threatened with 
extinction but rather because of inept management than technological failure. It can be argued 
that, if anything, the 21st century market is dominated by a desire for stable trading 
circumstances, reinforced by external restrictions and monopolistic tendencies and these forces 
work to reduce the crudest manifestations of competition.   
 
3.3.7. Diffusion: Production, Spin-Offs & Redundancies 
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New media technologies are therefore introduced between the accelerator (or the push) of 
supervening social necessity and the brake (or the pull) of the suppression of their radical 
potential. This conflict governs the nature and the pace of the diffusion of the technology. This 
final transformation heralds the last phase of technological performance, that of production.  In 
contrast to economic analysis of technological change, the production phase is, for the cultural 
determinist, unproblematic.  So determined has the technology been by social forces at every 
stage, it is bound to be adopted to one degree or another.  
  
The creative process which has brought the technology through prototype and ‘invention’ 
phase to this point does not stop and technological performances yet continue either as 
refinements to the basic devices or, responsive to further social needs, as spin-offs. Spin-offs can 
be seen as the products of technological performance synchronous with, or subsequent to, the 
original device's diffusion.  A focus on the initial technology can lead to the supposition that 
spin-offs represent some species of unintended or unforeseen consequence; but this is the result 
of failing to identify an appropriate discrete supervening social necessity.  It is the case that the 
supervening social necessity producing the microchip (military miniaturisation programmes in 
the later 1950s) was not the same as that producing the spin-off videogames which used those 
chips. Videogames were the product of a general social need for games, millennia old.  Many 
technologies produced similar ‘play’ variants for the same reason – the printed playing card, the 
electric train set, any plastic doll.  Audiotape is in like case as a storage medium for computing 
and a recording medium of moving images. These spin-off applications ‘fitted’.  
 
On the other hand, as with prototypes, the spin-off can be rejected as redundancies, applications 
already being met by other means.  Polaroid Land’s futile attempt to produce an instant movie 
system, as a spin-off from its instantaneous photographic system, in the face of the arrival of 
videotape would be a case in point. It was redundant, attempting to meet a social need for an 
instant motion picture system that was already being successfully met by tape. 
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